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CASE NOTES
INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY-REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN
GIVEN ONLY IN WORDS OF STATUTE
Plaintiff recovered for personal injuries received as a result of a col-
lision at an intersection between an automobile, in which he was a guest,
and defendant's truck. The jury was instructed in the words of the right-
of-way statute of the Motor Vehicles Act.' As there was sharp conflict in
the evidence, defendant excepted to the instruction on the grounds that
the statute failed to tell the jury that they must also consider the speed
and relative positions of the vehicles to the point of collision. The Appel-
late Court of Illinois agreed with the defendant and held the instruction to
be prejudicially erroneous. Walker v. Shea-Matson Trucking Co., 344 I11.
App. 466, 1o N.E. 2d 449 (195i).
The Walker case represents the exception to the general rule governing
instructions in the language of the statute, as stated in Deming v. City of
Cbicago:2 "Where an instruction is given in the language of a statute
which is pertinent to the issues it must be regarded as sufficient. Laying
down the law in the words of the law itself ought not to be pronounced
error."'8 However, the giving of such instructions without making them
applicable to the facts before the jury has been criticized and condemned. 4
It is the duty of the court to give to the jury rules of law which are appli-
cable to the evidence in the case and to make the application so that the
jury may understand the relation of the rules to the evidence. 5 An in-
struction in the words of the right-of-way statute is especially misleading
when not qualified by other instructions. Illinois courts of review have
repeatedly held that the right-of-way at intersections is not an absolute
right, but is subject to, and affected by the relative distances of the
vehicles from the point of intersection and the speed at which the vehicles
are traveling.6
1 111. Rev. Stat. (1943) c. 951, S 165: "Vehicles approaching or entering intersection:
Except as hereinafter provided motor vehicles traveling upon public highways shall
give the right-of-way to vehicles approaching along intersecting highways from the
right and shall have the right-of-way over those approaching from the left."
2321 Ill. 341, 345, 151 N.E. 886, 887 (1926).
3 Greene v. Fish Furniture Co., 272 Ill. 148, i1i N.E. 725 (1916); Mertens v. South-
ern Coal Co., 235 1. 540, 85 N.E. 743 (19o8); Mt. Olive Coal Co. v. Rademacher, 19o
II1. 538, 6o N.E. 888 (19o). For other cases consult 15 A.L.R. 1491 (192).
4 Mayer v. Springer, 192 Il. 27o, 6i N.E. 348 (goi).
5 People v. Isbell, 363 fll. 264, 2 N.E. 2d 84 (1936); Burke v. Zwick, 299 Inl. App. 558,
2o N.E. Ad 912 (1939); Watson v. Kammeier, 203 Ill. App. 31 (96).
6 Wilson v. Hobrock, 344 Ill. App. 147, ioo N.E. 2d 412 (1951); Leech v. Newell,
323 Ill. App. 510, 56 N.E. 2d 138 (1944); Krawitz v. Levinstein, 320 Ill. App. 618, 52
N.E. 2d 6o (943); Partridge v. Enter prise Transfer Co., 307 Ill. App. 386, 30 N.E. 2d
947 (i4o); Riddle v. Mansager, 254 Il. App. 68 (1'92); Heidler Co. v. Wilson and
Bennett Co., 243 IMI. App. 89 (1926); Salmon v. Wilson, 227 Ill. App. 286 (1923).
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
In Salmon v. Wilson,7 it was held that while the statute gives the right-
of-way to vehicles approaching along intersecting highways from the right
over those approaching from the left, it does not intend to confer that
right regardless of the distance the approaching cars may be from the
point of intersection. An instruction given in the words of the right-of-
way statute, in Krawitz v. Levinstein,s was held erroneous for the same
reason as in the instant case. Again, in Riddle v. Mansager, the court
stated, "... the statute does not authorize such assertion of the right-of-
way regardless of circumstances, distance or speed."' 1
Other jurisdictions having similar statutes have interpreted the statute
in the same way.i" The Maryland Court, in Wlodkowski v. Yerkaitis,12
after discussing the rule in respect to distance and speed of vehicles ap-
proaching an intersection, continued:
Inasmuch as a vehicle approaching from the right does not have an absolute
right of way in every instance, regardless of its distance from the intersection
when the other vehicle enters from the left, the statutory right-of-way rule is
regarded as a cautionary guide, rather than a peremptory command ... various
other circumstances might materially affect the issue as to whether an asserted
right-of-way should be recognized.
Several jurisdictions have construed such statutes to mean that although
a vehicle may be approaching from the right, the vehicle on the left will
have the right-of-way if it reaches the point of intersection first.la The
majority of jurisdictions take the view that it is not a question of which
vehicle entered the intersection first, but whether both vehicles were ap-
proaching at approximately the same time, and whether under the circum-
stances it would raise a question in the mind of a reasonably prudent per-
son whether he had time to cross in the face of a vehicle approaching from
his right.14 The vehicle having the subordinate right must not take chances,
7 227 Ill. App. 286 (1923).
8 320 Il. App. 618, 5z N.E. 2d 6o (1943).
9 254 Il. App. 68 (1919).
10 254 11. App. 68, 72 (1929). Accord: Munns v. Chicago City R. Co., 235 11. App.
i6o (1924).
11Wlodkowski v. Yerkaitis, 19o Md. 128, 57 A. 2d 792 (1948); Lee v. City Brewing
Corp., 279 N.Y. 380, x8 N.E. 2d 628 (1939); Gendron v. Glidden, 84 N.H. i62, 148
At. 461 (1929); Paulsen v. Klinge, 92 N.J.L. 99, 104 Atl. 95 (S. Ct., 1918).
12 190 Md. 128, 132, 57 A. 2d 792, 794 (1948).
13Tate v. Shaver, 287 Ky. 29, 152 S.W. zd 259 (I941); Schneider v. Rolf, 211 Ky.
669, 278 S.W. ioo (1925); Fall City Ice and Beverage Co. v. Scanlan Coal Co., 2o8 K.
820, 271 S.W. 1097 (1925); Conner v. Dale, 63 Cal. App. 338, 218 Pac. 462 (1923);
Whitworth v. Jones, 58 Cal. App. 492, 209 Pac. 6o (1922).
14 Thomasson v. Burlington Transp. Co., 128 F. 2d 355 (C.A. roth, 1942); Gregware
v. Poliquin, 135 Me. 139, 19o At. 811 (1937); Salm v. Bleau, 24o N.Y. 614, 148 N.E. 728
(1925); Goden Eagle Dry Goods Co. v. Mockbee, 68 Colo. 312, x89 Pac. 85o (1920).
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make close calculations, or try to slip by on chance; it must give way to
the vehicle on the right when it is anywhere near the crossing. 15
Relying upon Moran v. Gatz,16 Burns v. Jackson,17 and Waterbury v.
Chicago, M. and St. P. Ry. Co.,'8 the court held that where a modified
construction has been placed upon the statute by courts of review, the in-
struction should be framed according to that construction and the jury
properly instructed as to its legal effect. In Burns v. Jackson,'9 the court,
citing the Waterbury case, held:
While numerous authorities uphold the practice of giving instructions con-
taining the very language of the statute, yet we think'that where a modified
construction has already been placed thereon by our Supreme Court,... the in-
struction should be framed accordingly, otherwise it would be apt to mislead
the jury.
However, the Supreme Court of Illinois has never granted certiorari to
review the decisions of the appellate courts where it was held reversible
error to charge the jury in the words of the right-of-way statute without
qualification. Nevertheless, decisions of the appellate courts should come
within the rule set out in the Waterbury case, and modifying constructions
having been placed upon statutes by appellate courts, the lower courts
should frame their instructions accordingly.
All of the cases which apply this rule seem to involve some section of
the Motor Vehicle Act. In analyzing these statutes, particularly the right-
of-way statute, the legislature seems to have indicated an intention merely
to set up a guide rather than a hard and fast rule, leaving it to the courts
to properly qualify the statute in any instruction to the jury.
This principle that an instruction to the jury given in the words of the
statute is reversible error unless qualified does not seem to have any appli-
cation to other types of statutes than those already discussed.
PROCEDURE-IMPOSITION OF FEDERAL PRACTICE
ON STATE COURTS
Petitioner, employee of defendant railroad, was seriously injured when
an engine in which he was riding jumped the track. He claimed his injuries
were due to the defendant's negligence and brought an action in an Ohio
court under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.' Defendant claimed that
petitioner had signed a release; petitioner alleged that the release was ob-
tained by fraud.
15 Shuman v. Hall, 246 N.Y. 51, i58 N.E. x6 (1927).
'a 327 Il. App. 48o, 64 N.E. 2d 564 (946).
17 22 4 1. App.s 19 (1922). 1 207 III. App. 375 ('917).
19 a24 !1l. App. 519, 528 (1922).
1 35 Stat. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 (195).
